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Abstract 
The paper reviews adjustment dynamics in the EMU on the basis of estimated DSGE models for 
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sensitivity of IT to investment-related shocks, and a comparatively strong impact of global shocks 
on the DE economy. We also perform counterfactual exercises that apply the estimated shocks and 
parameters for ES to DE, FR, and IT. The counterfactual simulations suggest that differences in 
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1. Introduction 
Macroeconomic developments across Euro Area (EA) Member States (MS) have displayed a great 
deal of heterogeneity since the beginning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The 
heterogeneity includes a boom in the EA "periphery" and rather meagre growth in the EA "core" 
in the early years of EMU, and a protracted recession in the EA "periphery" and much stronger 
recovery in the EA "core" after the global financial crisis. 
Whether the heterogeneity across EA countries reflects differences in shocks, or differences 
in the transmission of shocks has been a longstanding question in the discussion of EMU. The 
general literature on the role of shocks and structure for business cycle differences across countries 
suggests that both elements are relevant. In an early paper on EMU, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1992) find shocks in a VAR to be significantly more idiosyncratic across EU countries and the 
adjustment to shocks in EU to be slower compared to US regions. Abbritti and Mueller (2013) 
argue based on a calibrated DSGE model that structure matters for unemployment and inflation 
differentials in monetary union. 
The role of shocks versus structure has also been discussed with respect to the relative 
performance of the EA and the US economies. Christiano et al. (2008) compare estimated DSGE 
models to show that shocks and structure matter for differences between EA and US aggregates. 
Sahuc and Smets (2008) perform counterfactuals with an estimated DSGE model and investigate 
whether differences in the interest rate policy between the ECB and the Fed are attributable to 
differences in the structure of the economies or differences in the size and nature of the shocks.  
This paper contributes to the literature by looking at business cycle heterogeneity in EMU 
through the lenses of estimated DSGE models for individual EA MS. Following Albonico et al. 
(2017), we have estimated country blocks for the four largest economies in the EA, namely 
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The model is set up in a configuration with the respective MS 
(DE/FR/IT/ES), the rest of the EA (REA), and the rest of the world (RoW). The structure of the 
country blocks, i.e. model equations, time span, observable variables, prior parameter distributions, 
is ex-ante identical, so that differences between DE, FR, IT, and ES are expressed ex-post by 
differences in the estimated parameter values and the estimated shock processes.  
The paper takes a comparative perspective to investigate the role of structural differences 
and idiosyncratic shocks. In a first step, we compare the adjustment dynamics of MS economies to 
identical shocks to assess the importance of structural differences. To the extent that outcomes 
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differ across countries in this scenario, the differences can be attributed to differences in the 
estimated economic structure. As an aside, we can compare the adjustment at country level to the 
adjustment of the EA aggregate to the same set of shocks to gauge whether the absence of nominal 
exchange rate adjustment and monetary policy independence has hampered macroeconomic 
adjustment at the level of MS significantly. In a second step, we perform counterfactuals (i) by 
imposing the estimated (smoothed) shocks from ES on the model blocks for DE, FR and IT and 
(ii) by imposing the estimated ES parameter with the country-specific estimated shocks such that 
the structure across MS is (largely) harmonised. Heterogeneity in outcomes in the latter case would 
be attributable to country-specific shocks rather than to differences in model structure.  
Our estimated model is a standard New Keynesian model with price and wage rigidity. It 
emphasizes the role of price and wage adjustment in the transmission of shocks as a means to 
achieve relative price adjustment and contain fluctuations in economic activity in response to 
shocks. By contrast, financial frictions that have arguably played a substantial role for EA 
heterogeneity, notably the credit growth that has reinforced the boom and the deleveraging that has 
reinforced the recession in the EA "periphery", are not modelled as endogenous transmission 
channels, but rather reflected in the estimated (savings and investment) shocks.   
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts to 
motivate the paper. Sections 3 and 4 outline the structure of the model and the methodology for the 
model solution and estimation, respectively. Section 5 compares IRFs of individual EA countries 
and the EA aggregate for the shocks that have been main drivers of fluctuations in economic 
activity over the estimation horizon according to the estimated models, and it presents 
counterfactuals that illustrate the importance of differences in shocks versus structure (i.e. shock 
transmission) for macroeconomic heterogeneity over the sample period. Section 6 summarizes the 
findings and concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts 
Macroeconomic developments across Euro Area (EA) Member States (MS) have displayed a large 
amount of heterogeneity since the beginning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Figure 1 
shows year-on-year real GDP growth for the EA aggregate and the four big MS (DE, FR, IT and 
ES) considered in this paper over the period 1991-2017. The Figure illustrates the difference in 
average growth rates over the sample, including since the start of EMU in 1999. The timing of 
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upturns and downturns in GDP growth appears to be fairly synchronised for our set of countries, 
whereas the strength of fluctuations in the growth rate differs. 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth 1991-2017 (year-on-year, %). 
 
Source: Ameco. 
 
The output gap as indicator of cyclical fluctuations around potential output shows a similar pattern 
as displayed in Figure 2. The timing of upswings and downswings in the business cycle is similar 
for DE, FR, IT, ES and the EA aggregate, but the amount of fluctuations varies. In particular, the 
range between maximum and minimum values of the output gap appears to be largest for Spain, 
and rather modest for France. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the volatility of economic activity for 1999q1-
2017q2 on a quarterly basis. The Table shows data moments for selected variables for DE, FR, IT, 
ES and the EA aggregate. In particular, it lists standard deviations and correlations with domestic 
real GDP growth. All variables are in quarter-on-quarter growth rates or first differences (real 
interest rate, TBY). Real GDP growth in DE, IT and ES has been more volatile than in the EA 
aggregate according to Table 1, contrary to FR. Contrary to the picture in Figures 1-2, GDP growth 
in ES does not stand out as particularly volatile based on quarterly data, which indicate a higher 
standard deviation for DE and IT. ES is characterised by strong movements in hours worked, real 
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wage growth, and consumption, however. Finally, the correlations between GDP growth, on the 
one hand, and inflation, REER, and TBY, on the other hand, change sign across countries, 
potentially indicating differences in the importance of demand versus supply shocks. 
Figure 2: Annual output gap 1991-2017 (%). 
 
Source: Ameco. 
 
Table 1: Empirical business-cycle statistics, 1999q1-2017q2. 
 EA DE FR IT ES 
Variables std (%) 
corr 
(x,GDP) 
std (%) 
corr 
(x,GDP) 
std (%) 
corr 
(x,GDP) 
std (%) 
corr 
(x,GDP) 
std (%) 
corr 
(x,GDP) 
Real GDP 0.61 1 0.84 1 0.48 1 0.74 1 0.70 1 
Consumption 0.38 0.72 0.58 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.58 0.74 0.88 0.83 
Investment 2.59 0.79 4.22 0.49 2.77 0.59 4.12 0.58 2.88 0.60 
Hours worked 0.44 0.80 0.54 0.58 0.39 0.59 0.57 0.58 1.13 0.77 
GDP deflator 0.26 0.02 0.35 -0.25 0.29 0.15 0.54 -0.10 0.47 0.57 
CPI deflator 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.20 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.65 0.28 
Real wage 0.29 -0.27 0.50 -0.10 0.43 -0.08 0.73 0.15 1.15 -0.15 
Real interest rate 0.19 0.15 0.23 -0.07 0.16 -0.21 0.31 -0.21 0.19 -0.10 
Real exchange rate 2.27 0.25 1.26 0.28 1.06 0.22 1.47 0.20 1.24 -0.11 
… relative to std of real GDP 3.72 - 1.50 - 2.21 - 1.99 - 1.77 - 
Trade balance to GDP 0.31 -0.09 0.67 0.34 0.39 -0.17 0.41 -0.19 0.63 -0.45 
Note: First differences for real interest rate and trade balance; quarter-on-quarter growth rates for all other variables; 
an increase in the REER indicates real effective depreciation. Moments are computed on de-trended variables.  
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3. Model description 
The analysis is based on the Global Multi-country (GM) model of the European Commission with 
an EA Member State (MS), the rest of the EA (REA), and the rest of the world (RoW) as building 
blocks (see Albonico et al. 2017). The EA MS block of the model is rather detailed, while the REA 
and RoW blocks are more stylized. The EA MS block assumes two (representative) households, 
firms and a government. EA MS households provide labour services to domestic firms. One of the 
two households (Ricardians) in each country has access to financial markets, owns her country’s 
firms and can smooth their consumption. The other household (liquidity-constrained) has no access 
to financial markets, does not own financial or physical capital, and consumes the disposable wage 
and transfer income in each period. 
Final output in the EA MS is generated by perfectly competitive firms that combine 
domestic and imported intermediate inputs. Intermediates are produced by monopolistically 
competitive firms using local labour and capital as inputs. EA MS wages are set by monopolistic 
trade unions. Nominal differentiated goods prices and nominal wages are sticky. Governments 
purchase the local final good, make lump-sum transfers to local households, levy labour, 
consumption and capital taxes and issue debt. Given the monetary union setting, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor-type rule defined on EA 
aggregate inflation and the output gap. All exogenous random variables in the model follow 
independent autoregressive processes.  
 
3.1. EA Member State households 
The household sector consists of a continuum of households 𝑗 ∈ [0; 1]. There are two types of 
households, savers ("Ricardians", superscript s) who own firms and hold government and foreign 
bonds and liquidity-constrained households (subscript c) whose only income is labour income and 
who do not save. The share of savers in the population is 𝜔𝑠. 
Both households enjoy utility from consumption 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟  and incur disutility from labour 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟  (𝑟 =
𝑠, 𝑐). On top of this, Ricardian’s utility depends also on the financial assets held. Date t expected 
life-time utility of household r, is defined as: 
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟 = ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑐 )𝛽𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟 (∙) 
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where 𝛽 is the (non-stochastic) discount factor (common for both types of households) and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑐  is 
the saving shock. 
 
3.1.1. Ricardian households 
The Ricardian households work, consume, own firms and receive nominal transfers 𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠  from the 
government. Ricardians have full access to financial markets and are the only households who own 
financial assets, 
𝐴𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡, where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
 is consumption price, including VAT.1 Financial wealth of 
household j consists of bonds 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 and shares 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆  is the nominal price of shares in t 
and 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡 the number of shares held by the household: 
𝐴𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 =
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 +
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡  
It is assumed that households invest only in domestic shares. Bonds consist of government 
domestic, 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑡
𝑔
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡, and foreign bonds
2, 
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡 𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑤
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 , and private risk-free bonds, 
𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 (in zero supply), 
with 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡 the bilateral exchange rate and 𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑡 ≡ 1.  
The period t budget constraint of a saver household j is: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 + (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔 )𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔 + (1 + 𝑖𝑙𝑡−1
𝑏𝑤 )𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝑤 + (1 + 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑟𝑓 )𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝑟𝑓
+ (𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑑𝑘𝑡)𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 + 𝐴𝑗𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑊𝑘𝑡 is the nominal wage rate, 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠  is the employment in hours, and 𝜏𝑘
𝑁 the labour tax rate. 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 , is the GDP price deflator. 𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔
, 𝑖𝑙𝑡−1
𝑏𝑤  , 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑟𝑓
 are returns on domestic government bonds, foreign 
bonds of region l, and risk-free bonds, respectively. 𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠  are government transfers to savers and 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑡 are lump-sum taxes paid by savers. Intermediate goods producers paying dividends 𝑑𝑘𝑡 to 
savers.  
We define the gross nominal return on domestic shares as: 
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠 =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑆  
                                                 
1 Note that 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
 is related to 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 , the private consumption deflator in terms of input factors, by the formula: 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 =
(1 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶)𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶  where 𝜏𝐶 is the tax on consumption. 
2 We assume only one type of foreign bonds, 𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑤 , issued by RoW and denominated in RoW currency.  
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The instantaneous utility functions of savers, 𝑢𝑠(∙), is defined as: 
𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 (𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 ,
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡 )
=
1
1 − 𝜃𝑘
(𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )
1−𝜃𝑘
−
𝜔𝑘
𝑁𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈
1 + 𝜃𝑘
𝑁 (𝐶𝑘𝑡)
1−𝜃𝑘
(𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠 )
1+𝜃𝑘
𝑁
−  (𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )−𝜃𝑘  
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡  
where 𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 = ∫ 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑠1
0
𝑑𝑗, and 𝐶𝑘𝑡 = 𝜔
𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 + (1 − 𝜔𝑠)𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑐  ; ℎ𝑘 ∈ (0; 1) measures the strength of 
external habits in consumption, 𝜔𝑘
𝑁 the weight of the disutility of labour, and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈  captures a labour 
supply (or wage mark-up) shock.  
The disutility of holding risky financial assets, 𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴 , is defined as: 
𝑈𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴 = (𝛼𝑘
𝑏𝐵0 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡−1
𝑏 ) 𝐵𝑗𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔 + ((𝛼𝑙𝑘
𝑏𝐵0 + 𝜀𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝑏𝑤 ) 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡−1𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝑤 +
𝛼𝑙𝑘
𝑏1
2
(
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡−1𝐵𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑡−1
𝑤
𝑃𝑘−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘−1 
)
2
)
+ (𝛼𝑘
𝑠𝑆0 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡−1
𝑆 ) 𝑃𝑠𝑡−1
𝑠  𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 
Internationally traded bonds are subject to transaction costs in form of a function of the average 
net foreign asset position relative to GDP. The asset specific risk premium shock depends on an 
asset specific exogenous shock 𝜀𝑥 , 𝑥 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑆, 𝑏𝑤} and an asset specific intercept 𝛼𝑥 , 𝑥 ∈
{𝑏0, 𝑆0, 𝑏𝑤0}. Similar to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Fisher (2015), the 
approach of modelling the disutility of holding risky assets captures the households’ preferences 
for the safe short term bonds, which generates endogenously a wedge between the return on risky 
assets and safe bonds.3 As in Benigno (2009) and Ratto et al. (2009), we assume that only the RoW 
bond is traded internationally. It follows that households in the Euro Area can invest in both 
national and foreign assets, while RoW households can only invest in domestic bonds. 
The Ricardian household problem leads to the following first order conditions (FOC): 
The FOC w.r.t. savers' consumption produces: 
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 (𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑠 )−𝜃 = 𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠  
where 𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. 
                                                 
3 This modification is along the lines of the money-in-utility approach by Sidrauski (1967), in which model agents 
derive utility from their holdings of money. In our model, it reflects the costs of holding risky assets relative to risk-
free assets. A similar framework is used by Vitek (2017).  
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The FOC w.r.t. domestic risk-free bond: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡] = 1 
The FOC w.r.t. domestic government bonds: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑔 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐵 − 𝛼𝑘𝑘
𝑏0
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 ] = 1 
with 𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
 the consumption deflator inflation rate and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐵  the risk-premium on government bonds. 
The FOC w.r.t. domestic stocks: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑠
(1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠 ) − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑆 − 𝛼𝑘𝑘
𝑠0
1 + 𝜋𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 ] = 1 
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑆  the risk premium on stocks. The above optimality conditions are similar to a textbook 
Euler equation, but incorporate asset-specific risk premia that depend on an exogenous shock 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐴  
as well as the size of the asset holdings as a share of GDP, see Vitek (2017) for a similar 
formulation. Taking into account the Euler equation for the risk-free bond and approximating, the 
equations simplify to the familiar expressions: 
𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑔 = 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓 + 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 
𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓 + 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠  
In the equations above, 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑔
 is the risk premium on domestic government bonds, and 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠  
is a risk premium on domestic shares. It is introduced to capture, in a stylized manner, financial 
frictions.4 
Given the monetary union setting, we assume that an uncovered interest rate parity condition links 
the interest rate of EMU country to the EA interest rate (set by the central bank): 
(1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓) = (1 + 𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡) − (𝛼𝑘
𝑏𝑤1 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑊
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐹𝑄) 
where 𝛼𝑘
𝑏𝑤1 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑊
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
 captures a debt-dependent country risk premium on net foreign asset 
holdings as external closure to ensure long-run stability (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003; 
Adolfson et al., 2008). Following Smets and Wouters (2007) we also introduce an additional risk 
premium shock, 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐹𝑄
 (‘Flight to Safety’), which creates a wedge between the EA interest rate , 𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡, 
                                                 
4 Observationally, this approach is equivalent to exogenous risk premia as well as risk premia derived in the spirit of 
Bernanke et al. (1996). 
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and the return on domestic risk-free assets, 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓
. Since a positive shock increases the required return 
on domestic assets and the cost of capital, it reduces current consumption and investment 
simultaneously and helps explaining the co-movement of consumption and investment. 
 
3.1.2. Liquidity-constrained household 
The liquidity-constrained household consumes her disposable after-tax wage and transfer income 
in each period of time ('hand-to-mouth'). The period t budget constraint of the liquidity-constrained 
household is: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶)𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑇𝑘𝑡
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑗𝑘𝑡. 
The instantaneous utility functions for liquidity-constrained households. 𝑢𝑐(∙), is defined as: 
𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 (𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 , 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 ) =
1
1 − 𝜃𝑘
(𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 − ℎ𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡−1
𝑐 )
1−𝜃𝑘
− (𝐶𝑘𝑡)
1−𝜃𝑘 𝜔𝑘
𝑁𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈
1 + 𝜃𝑘
𝑁 (𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐 )
1+𝜃𝑘
𝑁
 
with 𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝑐 = ∫ 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐1
0
𝑑𝑗. 
 
3.1.3. Wage setting 
Households are providing differentiated labour services, 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑟 , in a monopolistically competitive 
market. We assume that there is a labour union that bundles labour hours provided by both types 
of domestic households into a homogeneous labour service and resells it to intermediate goods 
producing firms. We assume that Ricardian and liquidity-constrained households’ labour are 
distributed proportionally to their respective population shares, 𝜔𝑘
𝑠 . Since both households face the 
same labour demand schedule, each household works the same number of hours as the average of 
the economy. It follows that the individual union's choice variable is a common nominal wage rate 
for both types of households. 
The wage rule is obtained by equating a weighted average of the marginal utility of leisure, 𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝑁 , to 
a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption, 𝜆𝑘𝑡, times the real wage adjusted for a 
wage mark-up. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced in the form of adjustment costs for 
changing wages. The wage adjustment costs are borne by the household. We also allow for real 
wage rigidity as in Blanchard and Galí (2007), where the slow adjustment of real wages occurs 
through distortions rather than workers’ preferences. The optimality condition is given by: 
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(𝜇𝑘
𝑤 𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝑁
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )
1−𝛾𝑘
𝑤𝑟
((1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)
𝑊𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 )
𝛾𝑘
𝑤𝑟
= (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑁)
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 +𝛾𝑘
𝑤 (
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑊𝑘𝑡−1
− 1 − (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑘
𝑤)(𝜋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑦 − ?̅?) − 𝜋𝑤)
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑊𝑘𝑡−1
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
− 𝛾𝑘
𝑤𝐸𝑡 [𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝜆𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑘𝑡+1
𝑁𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶,𝑣𝑎𝑡 (
𝑊𝑘𝑡+1
𝑊𝑘𝑡
− 1 − (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑘
𝑤)(𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑦 − ?̅?)
− 𝜋𝑤)
𝑊𝑘𝑡+1
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ] + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑈 𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
where 𝜇𝑘
𝑤 is the wage mark-up, 𝛾𝑘
𝑤𝑟 is the degree of real wage rigidity, 𝛾𝑘
𝑤 is the degree of nominal 
wage rigidity and 𝑠𝑓𝑘
𝑤 is the degree of forward-lookingness in the labour supply equation. 𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝑁  is 
the marginal disutility of labour and defined as: 
𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝑁 = 𝜔𝑘
𝑁(𝐶𝑘𝑡)
1−𝜃𝑘(𝑁𝑘𝑡)
−𝜃𝑘
𝑁
 
 
3.2. EA Member State production sector 
3.2.1. Total output demand 
Total output, 𝑂𝑘𝑡, is produced by perfectly competitive firms by combining value added, 𝑌𝑘𝑡, with 
energy input, 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡, using the following CES production function: 
𝑂𝑘𝑡 = [(1 − 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑜
(𝑌𝑘𝑡)
𝜎𝑘
𝑜−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑜
+ (𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑜
(𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡)
𝜎𝑘
𝑜−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑜
]
𝜎𝑘
𝑜
𝜎𝑘
𝑜−1
  
where 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙 is the energy input share in total output and elasticity 𝜎𝑘
𝑜 is inversely related to the 
steady-state gross output price mark-up. It follows that the demand for 𝑌𝑘𝑡 and 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡 by total output 
producers is, respectively: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙) (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑜
𝑂𝑘𝑡 
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡 = 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙 (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑜
𝑂𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  and 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 are price deflators associated with 𝑌𝑘𝑡 and 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡, respectively. Since Oil is 
assumed to be imported from RoW, the oil price is given by: 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 = 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 + 𝜏𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0, 
where 𝜏𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0 is the excise duty. The price index of total output 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂  is: 
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𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 = [(1 − 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )1−𝜎𝑘
𝑜
+ 𝑠𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙)
1−𝜎𝑘
𝑜
]
1
1−𝜎𝑘
𝑜
 
 
3.2.2. Intermediate goods producer 
Each firm 𝑖 ∈ [0; 1] produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for 
varieties produced by other firms. Given imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistically 
competitive in the goods market and face a downward-sloping demand function for goods. 
Domestic final good producers then combine the different varieties into a homogenous good and 
sell them to domestic final demand goods producers and exporters. 
Differentiated goods are produced using total capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡 , and labour, 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡, which are combined 
in a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 = [𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌  (𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡)]
𝛼
(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡  )
1−𝛼
− 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑘𝑡 
Where 𝛼 is the steady-state labour share, 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌  is labour-augmenting productivity common to all 
firms in the differentiated goods sector, and 𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 and 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 are firm-specific level of capital 
utilization and labour hoarding, respectively.5 Total capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡, is the sum of private installed 
capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡, and public capital, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐺 . 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑘𝑡 captures fixed costs in production. Total Factor 
Productivity, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑘𝑡, can therefore be defined as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑘𝑡 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )𝛼. 
Since TFP is not a stationary process, we allow for two types of shocks that are related to a non-
stationary process and its autoregressive component:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 ) =  𝑔𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐿𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑔𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ =  𝜌𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔𝑘𝑡−1
𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜌𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ )𝑔𝐴𝑌0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑔𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅
 
where 𝑔𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑔𝐴𝑌0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are the time-varying growth and the long-run growth of technology, 
respectively, and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐿𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅  is a permanent technology shock.  
The monopolistically competitive producers maximize the real value of the firm, 𝑉𝑘𝑡, equal to a 
discounted stream of future dividends 𝑑𝑘𝑡, 𝑉𝑘𝑡 = 𝑑𝑘𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡[𝑠𝑑𝑓𝑘𝑡+1𝑉𝑘𝑡+1], with the stochastic 
discount factor 
                                                 
5 According to Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), firms prefer not to layoff workers when the demand is temporarily 
low, because firing workers may be more costly than hoarding them. Additionally, the inclusion of labour hoarding 
allows to match the observed co-movement between output and working hours. 
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𝑠𝑑𝑓𝑘𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠 ) (1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦 )⁄ ≈ (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑟𝑓 + 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠 ) (1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦 )⁄  
which depends directly on the investment risk premium, 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑠 . The dividends are defined as: 
𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝐾) (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 −
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝜏𝑘
𝐾𝛿𝑘
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 −
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 is physical investment, 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼  is investment price, 𝜏𝑘
𝐾 is the corporate tax, 𝛿𝑘 is capital 
depreciation rate. Following Rotemberg (1982), firms face quadratic adjustment costs, 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡, 
Adjustment costs are associated with the output price, 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌 , and labour input, 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡, adjustment or 
moving capacity utilization, 𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡, investment, 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡, and labour hoarding, 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡, away from their 
optimal level:  
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌 ) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) 
where 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑌 =
𝛾𝑝
2
𝑌𝑘𝑡 (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 − 1)
2
 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁 =
𝛾𝑛
2
𝑌𝑘𝑡 (
𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
− 1)
2
 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢 =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 (𝛾
𝑢,1(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 1) +
𝛾𝑢,2
2
(𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 1)
2) 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐼 =
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 (
𝛾𝐼,1
2
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1 (
𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1
− 𝛿)
2
+
𝛾𝐼,2
2
(𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡−1)
2
𝐾𝑘𝑡−1
) 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐹𝑁 = 𝑌𝑡 [𝛾𝑘
𝐹𝑁,2 (
𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘𝑡
− 𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
𝛾𝑘
𝐹𝑁,2
2
(
𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘𝑡
− 𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ )
2
] 
where 𝛾-s capture the degree of adjustment costs, and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘𝑡 is the active labour force. The 
maximization is subject to the production function, standard capital accumulation equation, 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡, and the usual demand condition that inversely links demand for variety i 
goods and the price of the variety: 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (
𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )
−𝜎𝑦
𝑌𝑘𝑡 
The usual equality between the marginal product of labour and labour cost holds, with a wedge 
driven by the labour adjustment costs: 
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦 𝛼
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑘𝑡 − 𝐹𝑁𝑘𝑡
− 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑁 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘)
𝑊𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
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with 𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦
 being inversely related to the price mark-up. The capital optimality condition reflects the 
usual dynamic trade-off faced by the firm: 
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌⁄
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌⁄
(𝜇𝑘𝑡+1
𝑦 (1 − 𝛼)
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝐼 𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝜏
𝑘𝛿 −
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢
𝐾𝑖𝑘𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑘𝑡+1) = 𝑄𝑘𝑡 
where 𝑄𝑘𝑡 has the usual Tobin's interpretation. 
FOC w.r.t. investment implies that Tobin's Q varies due to the existence of investment adjustment 
costs: 
𝑄𝑘𝑡 = 1 + 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐼  
Firms adjust their capacity utilization and labour hoarding depending on the conditions on the 
market via the optimality condition, respectively: 
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌⁄
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢𝑘𝑡
= 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑐𝑢  
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦 𝛼
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑘𝑡 − 𝐹𝑁𝑘𝑡
= 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐹𝑁 
Finally, the FOC w.r.t. differentiated output price pins down the price mark-up: 
𝜎𝑦
(𝜎𝑦 − 1)
𝜇𝑘𝑡
𝑦 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘) +
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑌
(𝜎𝑦 − 1)
+  𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇
 
with 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇  being the mark-up shock. The latter equation, combined with the FOC w.r.t. labour implies 
the Phillips curve of the familiar form: 
𝛾𝑘𝑡
𝑦 𝜎𝑘
𝑌 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘
𝑘)(𝜎𝑘
𝑌 − 1) + 𝛾𝑘
𝑃𝜎𝑘
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌
[𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑌 − ?̅?]
− 𝛾𝑘
𝑃𝜎𝑘
𝑌 [
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑃𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑌𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌𝑘𝑡
(𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌 − ?̅?)] + 𝜎𝑘
𝑌𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇
 
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜇
 is the inverse of the price mark-up shock.  
 
3.3. Trade 
3.3.1. Exchange rates 
The nominal effective exchange rate, 𝑒𝑘𝑡, measures the trade weighted average price of foreign 
currency in terms of domestic currency and is defined as:  
𝑒𝑘𝑡 = ∏(𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡)
𝑤𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑇
𝑙
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where 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡 are bilateral exchange rates between domestic country k and foreign country l. Similarly, 
the real effective exchange rate, 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑡, measures the trade weighted average price of foreign output 
in terms of domestic output: 
𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑡 = ∏(𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑘𝑡)
𝑤𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑇
𝑙
 
where 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑘𝑡 are bilateral real exchange rates between k and l. 𝑤𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑇  is the trade weight of the foreign 
trade partner l in the domestic trade and defined as: 
𝑤𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑇 =
1
2
(
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑘𝑡
+
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 ) 
where 𝑋𝑙𝑘𝑡 and 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡 stand for domestic exports to and imports from country l, respectively, and 
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑋  and 𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀  are the relevant price indices. 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 includes oil imports from RoW and is 
defined as 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡. 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋  and 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 are the respective price aggregates and 
are defined in the next section. 
 
3.3.2 Import sector 
Aggregate demand components 
The EA MS final aggregate demand component goods, 𝐶𝑘𝑡 (private consumption good), 𝐼𝑘𝑡, 
(private investment good), 𝐺𝑘𝑡 (government consumption good), and 𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺  (government investment 
good), as well as 𝑋𝑘𝑡 (export good) are produced by perfectly competitive firms by combining 
domestic output, 𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍 , with imported goods, 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 , where 𝑍 = {𝐶, 𝐼, 𝐺, 𝐼𝐺 , 𝑋}, using the following 
CES technology: 
𝑍𝑘𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧 [(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑧
(𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑧−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑧
+ (𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑧
(𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑧−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑧
]
𝜎𝑘
𝑧
𝜎𝑘
𝑧−1
 
where 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧
 is a shock to productivity in the sector producing goods, 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀  is a shock to the share, 
𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍
, of good-specific import demand components, and 𝜎𝑘
𝑧 is the import elasticity of substitution 
between goods varieties. It follows that the demand for 𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍  and imported goods 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍  are given by:  
𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
𝜎𝑧−1
(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍) (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
𝑍𝑘𝑡 
𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
𝜎𝑧−1
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍 (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
𝑍𝑘𝑡 
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where 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂  and 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 are the price deflators associated with 𝑂𝑘𝑡
𝑍  and 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑍 , respectively, and the total 
final good deflator 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍  is such that: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑍 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑧)
−1
[(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
+ 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀)1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
]
1
1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
 
 
Economy-specific final imports demand 
Final imported goods, 𝑀𝑘𝑡, are produced by perfectly competitive firms combining economy-
specific final imports goods, 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡, using CES production function: 
𝑀𝑘𝑡 = [∑(𝑠𝑙𝑘
𝑀)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
𝑙
(𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘
)
𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀−1
𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
]
𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀−1
 
where 𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀 is the price elasticity of demand for country l's goods and ∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑘
𝑀
𝑙 = 1 are import shares. 
The demand for goods from country l is then: 
𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡 = 𝑠𝑙𝑘
𝑀 (
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
 
while the imports price: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀 = [∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑘
𝑀(𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 )1−𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
𝑙
]
1
1−𝜎𝑘
𝐹𝑀
 
with 𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀  being the country-specific import goods prices. Since all products from country l are 
initially purchased at export price 𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋, the economy-specific import goods price can be expressed 
as: 
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋 
 
3.3.3. Export sector 
The exporting firms are competitive and export a good that is a combination of domestic output 
and import content. The corresponding export price is given by: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑋 )[(1 − 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑂 )1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
+ 𝑠𝑘
𝑀,𝑍(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀)1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
]
1
1−𝜎𝑘
𝑧
 
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑋  captures an export-specific price shock. 
 
19 
3.4. EA Member State policy 
3.4.1. EA monetary policy 
Monetary policy is modelled by a Taylor rule where the ECB sets the policy rate 𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡 in response 
to the annualized EA-wide inflation gap, 𝜋𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡,𝑄𝐴
, and the annualized EA output gap. The policy 
rate adjusts sluggishly to deviations of inflation from their respective target level and to the output 
gap; it is also subject to random shocks:  
𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌
𝑖(𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝑖)̅
+ (1 − 𝜌𝑖) [𝜂𝐸𝐴
𝑖𝜋 0.25(𝜋𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡,𝑄𝐴 − ?̅?𝐸𝐴
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡,𝑄𝐴)
+ 𝜂𝐸𝐴
𝑖𝑦 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 (0.25 ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑡−𝑟
4
𝑟=1
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (0.25 ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑡−𝑟
𝑝𝑜𝑡
4
𝑟=1
))] + 𝜀𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑖  
where 𝑖̅ = 𝑟 + ?̅?𝑌𝑜𝑏𝑠 is the steady-state nominal interest rate, equal to the sum of the steady-state 
real interest rate and GDP inflation. The policy parameters (𝜌𝑖, 𝜂𝑖𝜋, 𝜂𝑖𝑦) capture interest rate inertia 
and the response to the annualized inflation gap and output gap, respectively.  
 
3.4.2. Member State fiscal policy 
The government collects taxes on labour, 𝜏𝑘
𝑁, capital, 𝜏𝑘
𝐾, and consumption, 𝜏𝑘
𝐶 , as well as lump-
sum taxes, 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑘 , and issues one-period bonds, 𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝐺 , to finance government consumption, 𝐺𝑘𝑡, 
investment, 𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺 , transfers, 𝑇𝑘𝑡 , and the servicing of the outstanding debt. The government budget 
constraint is: 
𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑔 = (1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔 )𝐵𝑘𝑡−1
𝑔 − 𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐺 𝐺𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑘𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑇𝑘𝑡 
where nominal government revenues, 𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝐺 , are defined as: 
𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝐺 = 𝜏𝑘
𝐾(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡 − 𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡 − 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝛿𝑘𝐾𝑘𝑡−1) + 𝜏𝑘
𝑁𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑁𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑘
𝐶𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡. 
Excise duty on oil imports from RoW, 𝜏𝑘
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0, are determined exogenously. Government 
consumption, investment and transfers follow autoregressive processes. Government expenditure 
and receipts can deviate temporarily from their long-run levels in systematic response to budgetary 
or business-cycle conditions and in response to idiosyncratic shocks.  
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Government uses lump-sum taxes as budget closure and increases (decreases) taxes when the level 
of government debt and government deficit is above (below) the debt, ?̅?𝑘
𝐺, and deficit target, 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑘
𝑇, 
respectively:  
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘𝑡
= 𝜌𝑡𝑎𝑥 (
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘𝑡
− 𝑡𝑎𝑥̅̅ ̅̅̅) + 𝜂𝑘
𝐷𝐸𝐹 (
Δ𝐵𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡−1
− 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑘
𝑇) + 𝜂𝑘
𝐵 (
𝐵𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡−1
− ?̅?𝑘
𝐺) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑎𝑥  
The model uses a measure of discretionary fiscal effort (DFE) as defined by the European 
Commission (2013): 
𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑘𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝐺
𝑌𝑘𝑡
−
∆𝐸𝑘𝑡
𝐺 − (∆𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 1)𝐸𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺
𝑌𝑘𝑡
 
where 𝐸𝑘𝑡
𝐺  is the adjusted nominal expenditure aggregate, 𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡
 is the medium-term nominal 
potential output.6 In order to be consistent with the definition of DFE, which is defined with respect 
to all primary adjusted government expenditures, we define the aggregate nominal expenditure as:  
𝐸𝑘𝑡
𝐺 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐺 𝐺𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑇𝑘𝑡 
We use the following DFE rules for government consumption, investment and transfers: 
∆𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐺 𝐺𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
=
(∆𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺 𝐺𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
− 𝛼𝐺 {
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝐺 𝐺𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡−1
− ?̅?} + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐺  
∆𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
=
(∆𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝐼𝐺 𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
− 𝛼𝐼𝐺 {
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝐼𝐺 𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡−1
− 𝐼𝐺̅̅̅} + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺 
∆𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑇𝑘𝑡
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
=
(∆𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑇𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡
− 𝛼𝑇 {
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑇𝑘𝑡−1
𝑃𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡−1
− ?̅?} + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑇  
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐺 , 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺 , 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑇  are shocks to government consumption, investment and transfers, respectively. 
The parameters 𝛼𝐺 , 𝛼𝐼𝐺 , 𝛼𝑇 > 0 ensure long-run stability of the model.  
 
3.5. Closing the economy 
Market clearing requires that: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜏𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑌0 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼 𝐼𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐺𝑘𝑡 + 𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡 
where the trade balance, 𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡, is defined as the difference between exports and imports with 
domestic importers buying the imported good at the price 𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋: 
                                                 
6 The adjusted nominal expenditure removes interest payments and non-discretionary unemployment expenditures 
from total nominal expenditure. We define potential output as the output level that would prevail if labour input equaled 
steady-state per capita hours worked, capital stock was utilized at full capacity and TFP equaled its trend component. 
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𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑘𝑡 − ∑
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘
𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
𝑋𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑙
− 𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 
Export is a sum of imports from the domestic economy by other countries: 
𝑋𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑙
 
where 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡 stands for imports of economy l from the domestic economy k. Total imports are 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑡 
where non-oil imports are 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀(𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝐺).  
Net foreign assets, 𝐵𝑘𝑡
𝑤 , evolve according to: 
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘,𝑡𝐵𝑘,𝑡
𝑤 = (1 + 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑏𝑤 )𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑘,𝑡𝐵𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑤 + 𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑡 + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑘𝑡 
Since we allow for a non-zero trade balance in the steady-state, we include an international transfer, 
𝐼𝑇𝑅𝑘, calibrated to satisfy zero NFA in equilibrium. Finally, net foreign assets of each country l 
sum to zero: 
∑ 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑙
= 0. 
 
3.6. The REA and RoW blocks 
The model of the REA and RoW blocks (subscript k=REA, RoW) is simplified in structure. 
Specifically, it consists of a budget constraint for the representative household, demand functions 
for domestic and imported goods (derived from CES consumption good aggregators), a production 
technology for manufacturing output that uses labour as the only factor of production, a New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, and a Taylor rule. The REA and RoW blocks abstract from capital 
accumulation. There are shocks to labour productivity, price mark-ups for manufacturing output, 
the subjective discount rate, the relative preference for domestic vs. imported goods, as well as 
monetary policy shocks in the REA and RoW. 
Since RoW is an oil exporter, the budget constraint for the representative household is: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑙𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝑡 + 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑌  and 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 are price and volume of RoW final goods output, 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑙𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙  and 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑙𝑡 are 
price and volume of oil exports to country l=(EMU country), and 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 is the trade balance.  
The budget constraint for the representative household in REA, as an oil importer, is: 
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𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝜏
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝐶 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝑡 + 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡 
where 𝜏𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑡
𝑌0𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑡 captures the excise duty.  
The intertemporal equation for aggregate demand follows from the FOC for consumption: 
𝛽𝑡
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝜆𝑘𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑘𝑡
1 + 𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝐶 = 1 
with 𝛽𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐶
𝛽, (𝐶𝑘𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑘𝑡−1)
−𝜃
= 𝜆𝑘𝑡 and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝐶  as the REA and RoW demand shock.  
Final aggregate demand 𝐶𝑘𝑡 (in the absence of investment and government spending in the REA 
and RoW block) is a combination of domestic output, 𝑌𝑘𝑡, and imported goods, 𝑀𝑘𝑡, using the 
following CES function: 
𝐶𝑘𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝 [(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑐
(𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝐶 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑐−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑐
+ (𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀)
1
𝜎𝑘
𝑐
(𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑐−1
𝜎𝑘
𝑐
]
𝜎𝑘
𝑐
𝜎𝑘
𝑐−1
 
where 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶  is a shock to input components and 𝑠𝑘
𝑀 the import share. From profit maximization we 
obtain the demand for domestic and foreign goods: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑐−1
(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀) (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑐
𝐶𝑘𝑡 
𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝 )
𝜎𝑘
𝑐−1
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀 (
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 )
−𝜎𝑘
𝑐
𝐶𝑘𝑡 
where the consumer price deflator, 𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶  , is given by: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝐶 = (𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑝 )
−1
[(1 − 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀)(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌 )1−𝜎𝑘
𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑘
𝑀(𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑀)1−𝜎𝑘
𝑐
]
1
1−𝜎𝑘
𝑐
 
The intermediate good producers use labour to manufacture domestic goods given a linear 
production function: 
𝑌𝑘𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌 𝑁𝑘𝑡 
where 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝑌  captures a trend in productivity. 
Price setting follows a New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
𝜋𝑘𝑡
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑘
𝑌 = 𝛽
𝜆𝑘𝑡+1
𝜆𝑘𝑡
[𝑠𝑓𝑝𝑘(𝜋𝑘𝑡+1
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑘
𝑌) + (1 − 𝑠𝑓𝑝𝑘)(𝜋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑌 − ?̅?𝑘
𝑌)] + 𝜑𝑘
𝑌 ln(𝑌𝑘𝑡 − ?̅?𝑘) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
where 𝜆𝑘𝑡 = (𝐶𝑘𝑡 − ℎ𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡−1)
−𝜃𝑘 is the marginal utility of consumption, 𝑠𝑓𝑝𝑘 is the share of 
forward-looking price-setters, and 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝑌  is a cost push shock. 
Monetary policy in RoW follows a Taylor-type rule: 
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𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑖 (𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−1 − 𝑖)̅
+ (1 − 𝜌𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑖 ) [𝜂𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑖𝜋 0.25(𝜋𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡,𝑄𝐴 − ?̅?𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑡,𝑄𝐴)
+ 𝜂𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑖𝑦 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 (0.25 ∑ 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−𝑟
4
𝑟=1
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (0.25 ∑ 𝑌𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡−𝑟
𝑝𝑜𝑡
4
𝑟=1
))] + 𝜀𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑖  
Oil is considered to be an unstorable exogenous endowment of RoW and is supplied inelastically: 
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡 = ∑
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑙
 
where net oil exporting firms’ revenues in RoW are driven only by its price, 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 , which is 
assumed to be determined in RoW currency: 
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡
𝑂𝑖𝑙 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑌0
𝐴𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙
 
Total nominal exports of final goods for REA and RoW are defined as: 
𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑋𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑋 𝑀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑙
 
with the bilateral export price being defined as the domestic price subject to a bilateral price shock: 
𝑃𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑋 = exp (𝜀𝑙𝑘𝑡
𝑋 )𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑌  
We combine the FOCs with respect to international bonds of REA and RoW to obtain the 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition: 
𝐸𝑡 [
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝐸𝐴,𝑡+1
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝐸𝐴,𝑡
] (1 + 𝑖𝑅𝑜𝑊𝑡) = (1 + 𝑖𝐸𝐴𝑡) + 𝜀𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑏𝑤 + 𝛼𝐸𝐴
𝑏𝑤0 + 𝛼𝐸𝐴
𝑏𝑤1
𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑊,𝐸𝐴,𝑡𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑤
𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑌 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑡
 
where 𝜀𝐸𝐴𝑡
𝑏𝑤  captures a bond premium shock between EA and RoW (exchange rate shock), and 𝛼𝐸𝐴
𝑏𝑤1 
is a debt-dependent country risk premium on net foreign asset holdings to ensure long-run stability 
(see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003; Adolfson et al., 2008). 
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4. Model solution and econometric approach 
We compute an approximate model solution by linearizing the model around its deterministic 
steady-state. We calibrate a subset of parameters to match long-run data properties, and we estimate 
the remaining parameters using Bayesian techniques.7 We combine prior information about 
structural parameters and data likelihood to construct the posterior kernel and maximize it. The 
estimated model assumes 39 exogenous shocks, as it appears that many shocks are needed to 
capture the key dynamic properties of macroeconomic and financial data (e.g. Kollmann et al. 
2015). The large number of shocks is also dictated by the fact that we use a large number of 
observables (38) for estimation.8 Note that the number of shocks has to be at least as large as the 
number of observables to avoid stochastic singularity of the model. The observables employed in 
the estimation are listed in the Data Appendix A.2.  
The estimation uses quarterly data for the period 1999q1-2017q2. The model has been 
estimated using the slice sampler algorithm proposed by Neal (2003).9 The calibrated parameters, 
steady-state ratios and trade shares match average historical ratios of the four EA Member States 
considered in the paper and can be found in the Appendix A.1. Along the deterministic steady-state 
all real variables (deflated by the GDP deflator) are assumed to grow at a rate of 1.3% per year (the 
average growth rate of EA output over the sample period). Prices grow at an EA inflation rate of 
2% per year, adjusted by country-specific average productivities for the demand components 
(private and public consumption and investment). Population is detrended by the EA average rate 
of population growth (0.4% per year). The steady-state share of Ricardian households is set 
according to the survey evidence in Dolls et al. (2012). 
 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Posterior parameter estimates 
The posterior estimates of key model parameters for the four EA MS, and the EA aggregate for 
comparison, are reported in Table 2. The EA posterior estimates are obtained from a two-region 
(EA-RoW) model version of the GM model. The model properties discussed in what follows are 
evaluated at the posterior mode of the model parameters.  
                                                 
7 We use the DYNARE software (Adjemian et al. 2011) to solve the linearized model and to perform the estimation.  
8 According to Kollmann et al. (2015), we assume an additional exogenous shock for Germany by introducing an 
observable proxy (benefit replacement rate) for the labour market reform (‘Hartz reform’). 
9 See also Planas et al. (2015) for a detailed description on the theory and practice of slice sampling.  
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Table 2: Posterior estimates of key estimated parameters. 
Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution 
 Dist. 
Mean 
(Std.) 
Mode 
(Std.) 
Preferences   EA19 DE FR IT ES 
Consumption habit persistence B 
0.5 
(0.1) 
0.85 
(0.03) 
0.73 
(0.06) 
0.78 
(0.06) 
0.80 
(0.04) 
0.73 
(0.04) 
Risk aversion G 
1.5 
(0.2) 
1.43 
(0.20) 
1.41 
(0.16) 
1.38 
(0.25) 
1.39 
(0.17) 
1.55 
(0.23) 
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour 
supply 
G 
2.5 
(0.5) 
1.93 
(0.38) 
2.98 
(0.49) 
2.04 
(0.42) 
2.07 
(0.52) 
2.19 
(0.39) 
Total import price elasticity G 
2 
(0.4) 
1.38 
(0.17) 
1.30 
(0.13) 
1.38 
(0.15) 
1.17 
(0.07) 
1.27 
(0.10) 
Bilateral import price elasticity G 
2 
(1) 
 1.79 
(0.68) 
2.18 
(0.89) 
1.42 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.72) 
Nominal and real frictions        
Price adjustment cost G 
60 
(40) 
44.70 
(9.27) 
19.88 
(7.45) 
35.65 
(8.28) 
10.89 
(1.22) 
23.19 
(5.77) 
Nominal wage adj. cost G 
5 
(2) 
4.87 
(1.54) 
3.43 
(1.10) 
4.07 
(1.32) 
2.30 
(0.87) 
2.43 
(0.67) 
Real wage rigidity B 
0.5 
(0.2) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.96 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
Employment adjustment cost G 
60 
(40) 
28.43 
(12.03) 
54.39 
(21.33) 
107.97 
(62.84) 
26.21 
(10.79) 
9.31 
(5.33) 
Capital stock adjustment costs G 
60 
(40) 
27.06 
(8.75) 
31.03 
(12.07) 
34.16 
(11.71) 
13.91 
(5.06) 
32.10 
(10.45) 
Investment adjustment cost G 
60 
(40) 
47.86 
(18.42) 
11.19 
(8.89) 
22.25 
(12.97) 
12.99 
(6.54) 
35.89 
(18.49) 
Fiscal policy        
Lump sum taxes persistence B 
0.5 
(0.2) 
0.91 
(0.04) 
0.86 
(0.04) 
0.96 
(0.01) 
0.88 
(0.04) 
0.92 
(0.02) 
Lump sum taxes response to deficit B 
0.03 
(0.008) 
0.02 
(0.007) 
0.02 
(0.008) 
0.02 
(0.007) 
0.03 
(0.008) 
0.02 
(0.007) 
Lump sum taxes response to debt B 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Note: Cols. (1) lists model parameters. Cols. (2-3) indicate the prior distribution functions (B: Beta distribution; G: 
Gamma distribution). Identical priors are set for country-specific parameters. Cols. (4)-(8) show the mode and the 
standard deviation (Std.) of the posterior distributions of the Euro Area, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, 
respectively. 
 
The estimated habit persistence in consumption is particularly high in IT (0.80), indicating a 
sluggish adjustment of consumption to income shocks, similar to the EA aggregate. The risk 
aversion coefficient is in the same range for the EA aggregate and all four countries, varying from 
1.38 in FR to 1.55 in ES. In DE, we observe slightly more elastic labour supply. The total import 
price elasticity (elasticity between imports and domestic output) is higher in FR (1.38), the EA 
aggregate (1.38) and DE (1.30), and lower in IT (1.17), whereas the bilateral import price elasticity 
(the elasticity between imports from different sources) is significantly higher in FR (2.18). The 
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model estimates also suggest substantial differences in price and wage rigidities. The model 
estimate for IT suggests much lower price rigidity (10.89) compared to FR (35.65) and the EA 
average (44.70). Nominal wage adjustment costs seem to be lower in IT (2.30) and ES (2.43), while 
real wage inertia (wage norm) is high for all countries. The most striking difference in the posterior 
estimates possibly concerns employment adjustment costs, where FR (107.97) and ES (9.31) 
strongly contrast with the middle position of DE, IT and the EA average. Estimated low 
employment adjustment frictions in ES are in line with the finding of a strong employment response 
over the business cycle, and notably in the Great recession, which Bentolila et al. (2012) relate to 
the importance of temporary contracts and associated low firing costs in ES. Adjustment costs on 
the capital stock are particularly low in IT (13.91) and appear comparable across DE, FR, ES and 
the EA aggregate. However, investment adjustment costs indicate substantially higher rigidity in 
ES (35.89) and the EA aggregate (47.86). The fiscal feedback rule on lump-sum taxes exhibits 
relatively high persistence for FR (0.96), ES (0.92), and the EA average (0.91), implying a more 
drawn-out response to debt and deficit levels in this cases.  
 
5.2 Model fit 
In order to evaluate the capability of the model to fit the data, Table 3 compares sample and model-
implied moments for a subset of key statistics. We focus on volatilities of real GDP, consumption, 
investment, employment, the trade balance-to-GDP ratio and the GDP deflator as well as the cross-
correlation of GDP with its main components. The estimated models tend to overestimate the 
volatility of real variables. However, the relative magnitudes seem to be preserved, e.g. 
std(GC)/std(GY). Of particular note is the high volatility of investment, which is in line with the 
data patterns. Most of the correlations between GDP growth and its components are well captured. 
More precisely, all country models replicate well the correlation of consumption, investment and 
employment with output. Moreover, our estimated models are able to replicate both positive 
(Germany) and negative (France and Spain) correlations between the trade balance and GDP 
growth. However, the GDP deflator is mostly negatively correlated with output, but matches the 
data pattern only for Germany and Italy fairly well. Overall, the theoretical moments give 
additional credit to the plausibility of the estimated structural models to replicate key features of 
EA Member State business cycles. Figures A.4a-A.4d in the Appendix A.4 also show the Bayesian 
1-step-ahead prediction for key observables for DE, FR, IT and ES. 
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Table 3: Theoretical moments. 
 Model Data 
Variable Std (%) Corr (x,GDP) Std (%) Corr (x,GDP) 
 Germany 
GDP 1.07 1 0.84 1 
Consumption 1.05 0.41 0.58 0.27 
Std(C)/ Std(Y) 0.98  0.69  
Investment 5.04 0.41 4.22 0.49 
Hours worked 0.70 0.69 0.54 0.58 
GDP deflator 0.57 -0.34 0.35 -0.25 
Trade balance/GDP 0.71 0.34 0.67 0.34 
 France 
GDP 0.82 1 0.48 1 
Consumption 1.23 0.65 0.45 0.60 
Std(C)/ Std(Y) 1.50  0.95  
Investment 3.77 0.44 2.77 0.59 
Hours worked 0.61 0.75 0.39 0.59 
GDP deflator 0.57 -0.09 0.29 0.15 
Trade balance/GDP 0.49 -0.10 0.39 -0.17 
 Italy 
GDP 0.89 1 0.74 1 
Consumption 0.83 0.56 0.58 0.74 
Std(C)/ Std(Y) 0.93  0.78  
Investment 5.21 0.47 4.12 0.59 
Hours worked 0.71 0.66 0.57 0.59 
GDP deflator 0.83 -0.32 0.54 -0.11 
Trade balance/GDP 0.49 0.09 0.41 -0.19 
 Spain 
GDP 0.74 1 0.70 1 
Consumption 1.12 0.68 0.88 0.83 
Std(C)/ Std(Y) 1.51  1.25  
Investment 3.44 0.50 2.91 0.59 
Hours worked 1.08 0.64 1.13 0.77 
GDP deflator 0.53 0.03 0.47 0.58 
Trade balance/GDP 0.60 -0.30 0.63 -0.44 
Note: We use first differences for the trade balance-to-GDP ratio and quarter-on-quarter growth rates for 
all other variables. The model-predicted moments are generated by a version of the linearized model in 
which the covariance matrix of all exogenous variables is set at the covariance matrix of the smoothed 
estimates of the innovations.  
 
5.3 Impulse responses (structural differences across countries) 
Looking at impulse response functions (IRFs) is helpful to better understand the role of structural 
differences for the transmission of shocks in the model. In case of structural similarity one would 
expect to see a similar transmission of shocks across the four countries. This sub-section presents 
IRFs for four exemplary drivers (consumption and investment demand, foreign demand, and labour 
supply) of economic dynamics. The focus on demand shocks derives from the fact that they have 
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been the main driver of business-cycle volatility and divergence in the EA in our models, as 
discussed in Kollmann et al. (2015), Kollmann et al. (2016), and in’t Veld et al. (2014). We 
normalise the shock size across countries to 1% and set the AR(1) parameter to 0.8 for this exercise.  
Figure 3 shows the response to a positive private saving shock (savings increase), which is 
modelled as a persistent fall in the subjective rate of time preference of MS households. The shock 
triggers a persistent reduction in aggregate consumption. With sluggish price and wage adjustment, 
the domestic GDP and employment decline. The shock triggers a fall in the policy and a decline in 
the real interest rate in the medium term, leading to an increase in investment. The trade balance 
improves on impact due to a combination of lower import (domestic demand contraction) and 
stronger export demand (real exchange rate depreciation).  
Figure 3: Positive shock to the saving rate (decline in consumption demand). 
 
Note: The IRFs display percentage deviations (GDP, consumption, investment, hours, real wage, and real 
exchange rate) and percentage-point deviations from steady-state (real interest rate, GDP inflation, and trade 
balance-to-GDP ratio). A positive change in the real exchange rate corresponds to real effective depreciation.  
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Figure 3 also shows that the negative shock to domestic consumption has particularly negative 
consequences on activity and employment in ES, whereas the decline in employment in other MS 
is dampened (but also made more persistent) by stronger employment adjustment frictions (labour 
hoarding). Consequently, real wages in ES decline, whereas real wages increase elsewhere due to 
less decline in labour demand and higher estimated wage stickiness. Additionally, lower capital 
stock adjustment costs in IT lead to a stronger increase in investment compared to the other MS. 
Figure 4 presents the dynamic adjustment to an increase in the investment risk premium 
(financing costs), which leads to a decline in domestic investment demand. The decline of 
investment lowers aggregate demand, GDP and employment; domestic price inflation also 
declines. The decline in demand and prices triggers a reduction in the risk free interest rate, which 
strengthens the demand for consumption. 
Figure 4: Positive shock to the investment risk premium (decline in investment demand). 
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The decline in investment demand and activity is particularly pronounced in IT, for which the 
estimation indicates comparatively low costs of adjusting the stock of capital and the amount of 
investment. The strong response of activity in IT leads to comparatively strong REER depreciation 
and TBY improvement, which follows from less import demand and increasing price 
competitiveness. ES shows a similar decline in employment for less investment decline due to its 
estimated lower labour adjustment costs, which translates into declining real wages in ES. 
Figure 5: Positive shock to the RoW saving rate (decline in foreign demand). 
 
 
Figure 5 presents dynamic responses to a foreign demand shock, namely a positive shock to savings 
(negative shock to private demand) in the RoW. Analogously to the MS saving shocks, the positive 
RoW savings shock is modelled by a rise in the subjective discount rate in the RoW and its 
illustrative size chosen to generate 1% of GDP RoW consumption decline on impact. The shock 
lowers RoW demand and activity in combination with real effective appreciation in the EA and 
EA MS. The reduction in policy and real interest rates in response to lower output and inflation in 
the EA strengthens consumption and investment demand in EA MS. The fall in the domestic 
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savings rate (consumption increase) and the increase in the investment rate lead to a decline in the 
trade balance in the EA. The more pronounced real exchange rate appreciation in the EA is driven 
by a stronger nominal exchange rate appreciation of the euro. 
 Among the EA MS, DE experiences the strongest negative response of activity, inflation, 
the REER and TBY due to its stronger trade openness to the RoW. At the same time, falling 
inflation comes with a pronounced rise in DE real wages as nominal wages adjust less rapidly than 
prices. Low employment and investment adjustment costs in IT lead to a less pronounced decline 
in domestic activity. 
Figure 6: Positive shock to labour supply. 
 
 
Figure 6 finally shows dynamic responses to an increase in domestic labour supply in the EA and 
the EA MS respectively. The labour supply shock reduces the real wage and increases employment 
and GDP. The improved profitability and the reduction in the policy rate strengthen investment 
demand. The REER depreciates and the TBY improves, where the competitiveness gain outweighs 
the impact of higher domestic demand. 
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 ES and IT show the strongest positive employment, GDP and domestic demand effects, 
which are due to the particularly low estimated wage and labour adjustment costs in ES, and low 
costs of adjusting the stock of capital and the amount of investment in IT. The negative price 
responses imply a stronger initial increase in the real interest rate, which somewhat dampens 
investment growth. Comparatively strong downward price adjustment in ES leads to pronounced 
REER depreciation compared to other EA MS.  
In sum, the preceding IRFs indicate broadly similar adjustment behaviour to shocks across 
EA MS. There are some marked differences, however. In particular, demand and supply shocks 
generate a comparatively strong response of employment and real wages in ES given low degrees 
of estimated wage and labour adjustment costs. Shocks to investment conditions show a 
particularly pronounced response of activity and inflation in IT due to relatively low estimated 
values of capital stock and investment adjustment costs in IT. Finally, DE appears to be particularly 
sensitive to shocks in the RoW given its higher openness to extra-EA trade.   
 
5.4 Counterfactuals 
In this subsection, we show results from counterfactual simulations to assess the importance of 
differences in goods and factor market adjustment for the resilience of the different EA MS to 
shocks. In the first counterfactual, we take the estimated (smoothed) shock processes for ES 
(including also the foreign shocks in the ES-REA-RoW model) and simulate the models for the 
other three EA MS considered with the same shocks. In the second counterfactual, we simulate the 
models with the estimated country-specific shocks, but imposing the estimated parameters for ES 
(ES structure) on the DE, FR and IT model blocks.10 
 Figure 7 shows the counterfactuals for real GDP growth (year-on-year) in DE, FR and IT. 
The plots depict the actual Spanish (black dotted line) and actual MS (blue solid line) GDP growth 
together with the two counterfactuals of imposing either the estimated ES shocks (red solid line) 
or the estimated ES structure (dashed red line). Figure 7 suggests that differences in the estimated 
shocks have a comparably strong impact on MS real GDP growth compared to ES real GDP 
growth. More precisely, the counterfactual GDP growth in DE, FR and IT would have been closer 
                                                 
10 Christiano et al. (2008) and Sahuc and Smets (2008) present similar counterfactual for a comparison of EA and US 
dynamics. Christiano et al. (2008) assess the importance of differences in shocks and structure for the outcomes in the 
EA and US after 2001, while Sahuc and Smets (2008) analyse the driving forces behind the different interest rate 
behaviour in the EA and US. 
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to the actual GDP growth in ES had the former countries experienced the same shocks. Structural 
differences, to the contrary, seem to explain much less of the gap between real activity in the 
respective MS and ES.  
Figure 7: Real GDP growth counterfactuals (y-o-y). 
 
Note: Since we assume in our estimations the same global trend across countries, we take into account the 
estimated country-specific initial conditions based on the pre-sample period 1995q1 – 1998q4.  
 
In DE, e.g., the less pronounced fall in GDP growth in 2009 in the counterfactual that imposes ES 
shocks (red line) is due to the fact that trade and foreign demand shocks have made a considerably 
negative contribution to DE real GDP growth during the financial crisis and the global recession, 
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whereas the lower GDP growth in ES was mainly driven by domestic demand, particularly by an 
increase in investment risk premia and positive saving shocks (see Figure A.3a and A.3d in the 
Appendix A.3). On the other hand, the fast recovery in DE after the crisis would have been 
mitigated and the post-crisis slump much more pronounced compared to actual GDP growth (blue 
line). A similar picture for the post-crisis slump can be seen in FR, whereas real GDP growth in 
the last three years would have been higher with the imposed ES shocks due to strong domestic 
demand recovery and labour market reforms in ES (see Figures A.3b and A.3d in the Appendix).  
Table 4 compares the standard deviations of real GDP growth, employment (hours worked) 
and inflation (GDP deflator) as measures of macroeconomic volatility in the counterfactuals (CF) 
with (i) ES shocks and (ii) ES structure, respectively, to the standard deviations of the respective 
variables in the estimated models for DE, FR, and IT (country-specific shocks and structure).  
Table 4: Counterfactual moments with estimated ES shocks and structure. 
 DE FR IT ES 
Variables std (%) 
std (%) 
CF 
std (%) 
std (%) 
CF 
std (%) 
std (%) 
CF 
std (%) 
GDP 0.84  0.48  0.74  0.70 
     CF (ES shocks)  0.55  0.45  0.56  
     CF (ES structure)  0.91  0.51  0.64  
Hours worked 0.54  0.39  0.57  1.12 
     CF (ES shocks)  0.67  0.79  0.73  
     CF (ES structure)  0.93  0.66  0.81  
GDP inflation 0.35  0.29  0.54  0.47 
     CF (ES shocks)  0.45  0.55  0.50  
     CF (ES structure)  0.40  0.33  0.32  
Note: The Table reports the comparison of standard deviations (std in %) between the baseline with estimated country-
specific shocks and the counterfactual versions (CF) imposing estimated shocks for the ES model on DE, FR and IT 
("ES shocks") and imposing estimated structural parameters for ES on DE, FR and IT ("ES structure") respectively. 
Quarter-on-quarter growth rates for real GDP and hours worked. 
 
Table 4 shows that imposing the shocks estimated for ES reduces the GDP growth volatility in DE 
and IT compared to the data. By contrast, imposing ES parameter values increases the volatility of 
GDP growth in DE and FR compared to the data due to the particularly low labour market frictions 
(low estimated employment adjustment costs) in ES, which leads to higher short-run volatility of 
employment and consumption demand. In the counterfactuals for employment (hours worked), 
structural differences with respect to ES matter for all three MS countries, which is illustrated by 
the fact that imposing parameter estimates for ES moves the three countries closer to the degree of 
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employment fluctuations observed in ES. According to the simulations, GDP price inflation would 
have been more volatile in DE and FR with both ES shocks and ES structure compared to actual 
data, while GDP inflation in IT shows the opposite result and would have been less volatile with 
the imposed ES structure. The latter result reflects the relatively low degree of estimated price 
adjustment costs in IT (Table 2).  
In sum, Table 4 suggests that there is no clear pattern between the three EA MS whether 
differences in shocks or differences in the transmission of shocks (structural differences in goods 
and labour market) matter more for explaining macroeconomic volatility compared to ES. 
Counterfactuals for real GDP growth in DE and IT suggest that differences from ES are driven 
mainly by differences in shocks. Concerning the labour market, however, structural differences 
appear to be the main driver of the pronounced increase in employment (hours worked) volatility 
in DE and IT in the counterfactuals.  
It is important to mention that imposing ES shocks and ES parameter estimates does not 
make DE, FR and IT replicate the model results for ES fully. Imposing the same values for the 
parameters governing the model dynamics does not lead to strictly identical country blocks. A 
number of (policy-invariant) differences across countries remain that affect the response to shocks. 
These differences notably include country size, which implies a different weight in EA aggregates 
and EA monetary policy according to the EA Taylor rule, and trade openness, which implies 
differences in the transmission of foreign shocks and the strength of the trade channel. 
Figure 8: Policy-invariant differences across countries. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the gap between our counterfactuals for DE and the data for ES. In particular, the 
counterfactual real GDP growth for DE imposing both estimated ES shocks and ES structural 
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parameter estimates does not fully match real GDP growth in ES. The combination of ES shocks 
and structure closely tracks ES data, however, in particular when compared to data for DE.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper has reviewed adjustment dynamics in EMU through the lenses of estimated multi-
country DSGE models for four large (individual) Euro Area (EA) Member States (MS), the rest of 
the EA (REA), and the rest of the world (RoW). In particular, we have analysed to what extent 
goods and factor market frictions (price, nominal wage, and real rigidities) differ across countries 
(DE, FR, IT, and ES) and, hence, generate different or similar dynamic responses to identical 
shocks. Our results suggest broadly similar adjustment behaviour to shocks across EA MS. There 
are some marked differences, however. In particular, demand and supply shocks generate a 
comparatively strong response of employment and real wages in ES given low estimated values of 
wage and labour adjustment costs. Shocks to investment conditions show a particularly pronounced 
response of activity and inflation in IT due to relatively low estimated values of capital stock and 
investment adjustment costs in IT. Finally, DE appears to be particularly sensitive to shocks in the 
RoW given its higher openness to extra-EA trade.   
 In counterfactual simulations we have imposed, first, estimated shocks and, second, 
estimated parameters for the Spanish (ES) economy on the models for Germany (DE), France (FR), 
and Italy (IT) to assess whether ES shocks (including financial ones) or ES structural characteristics 
would have led to similar fluctuation in economic activity in these countries. The results from the 
counterfactuals do not provide a uniform picture: Imposing ES shocks reduces the volatility of real 
GDP growth in DE, FR and IT to below the observed value for ES. Imposing ES parameters raises 
GDP growth volatility in DE and FR, which reflects stronger employment fluctuations and the 
associated stronger fluctuation in domestic demand in ES. Concerning employment, ES shocks and 
parameter values lead to higher volatility of hours worked in DE, FR and IT, which a stronger 
contribution of structural differences. GDP inflation volatility in DE and FR increases with ES 
shocks and structure, whereas the volatility in IT drops relative to the data in line with relatively 
low estimated price stickiness in IT. The results are in line with the literature that stresses both 
structural differences in the transmission of shocks and idiosyncratic shocks as driver of business-
cycle heterogeneity.  
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The analysis in the paper is subject to limitations calling for further work. The limitations 
include the simple structure of the financial sector in the model, which omits amplifying 
mechanisms such as credit expansion and deleveraging dynamics. Financial frictions enter our 
model (mainly) through shocks rather than as part of the shock transmission. Future work should 
complement the finding of differences in the parameter estimates with a more thorough discussion 
of structural differences in goods and labour markets across the four countries. The (omitted) 
particular nature of shocks may affect the parameter estimates. An example is the sectoral 
composition of expansions and recessions that may shape the employment multiplier. Finally, the 
current analysis does not account for asymmetries in the model dynamics, which could derive from 
a temporarily binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, or asymmetric (downward) price 
or wage rigidity. 
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Appendix A:  
A.1 Calibrated parameters and steady-state ratios of EA Member States 
 
Description Calibrated parameters and ratios 
 DE FR IT ES 
EA Monetary Policy  
Nominal interest rate in SS 0.005 
CPI inflation in SS 0.004 
Interest rate persistence 0.838 
Response to inflation 1.548 
Response to GDP 0.086 
Preferences  
Consumption share of Ricardian households 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.69 
Intertemporal discount factor 0.9975 0.9975 0.9975 0.9975 
Degree of openness 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.29 
Preference for imports from RoW 0.53 0.42 0.50 0.46 
Preference for imports from REA 0.47 0.58 0.50 0.54 
Preference for gov’t bonds  -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0006 
Preference for stocks -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0026 
Preference for foreign bonds -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0048 
Weight of disutility of labour 2.98 4.62 7.79 7.62 
Production     
Cobb-Douglas labour share 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Depreciation of private capital stock 0.0142 0.0150 0.0136 0.0123 
Depreciation of public capital stock 0.0142 0.0150 0.0136 0.0123 
Share of oil in total output 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Linear capacity utilization adj. costs 0.0147 0.0166 0.0143 0.0140 
Fiscal policy     
Consumption tax 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Corporate profit tax 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Labour tax 0.40 0.54 0.45 0.35 
Deficit target 0.019 0.021 0.032 0.017 
Debt target 2.59 2.86 4.48 2.31 
Steady-state ratios     
Private consumption share in SS 0.57 0.55 0.60 0.60 
Private investment share in SS 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.20 
Gov’t consumption share in SS 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.18 
Gov’t investment share in SS 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Transfers share in SS 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.13 
Others     
Size of the country (% of world) 4.50 3.45 2.81 1.80 
Trend of total factor productivity  0.0029 0.0018 0.0027 0.0013 
Trend of private consumption specific productivity  0.0009 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0014 
Trend of gov’t consumption specific productivity  0.0008 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0004 
Trend of private investment specific productivity  -0.0011 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0020 
Trend of gov’t investment specific productivity  -0.0011 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0020 
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A.2 Data 
A.2.1 Data sources 
Data for the EA Member States (quarterly national accounts, fiscal aggregates, quarterly interest 
and exchange rates) are taken from Eurostat. Corresponding data for the US (which is part of RoW) 
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve. Bilateral trade flows 
are based on trade shares from the GTAP trade matrices for trade in goods and services. ROW 
series are constructed on the basis of the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) databases.  
A.2.2 Constructing of data series for ROW variables 
Series for GDP and prices in the ROW starting in 1999 are constructed on the basis of data for the 
following 58 countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Georgia, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,  Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. The ROW data are annual data from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases.  
A.2.3 List of observables 
The estimation uses the following time series for the EA Member States: Total factor productivity, 
real GDP, GDP deflator, population, total employment, employment rate, relative prices with 
respect to GDP deflator (VAT-consumption, government consumption, private investment, 
government investment, export and import), nominal EA policy rate, and nominal shares of GDP 
(consumption, government consumption, investment, government investment, government interest 
payment, transfers, public debt, wage bill and exports). The list of observables also includes the oil 
price and the nominal effective EUR exchange rate. For REA, we use data on total factor 
productivity, population, GDP, GDP deflator, trade balance-to-GDP ratio, export share to GDP as 
well as export and import prices relative to GDP deflator. Note that we observe the series for EA19 
and calculate within the model the consistent REA series. For RoW, we use data on total factor 
productivity, population, GDP, GDP deflator and the nominal policy rate.  
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A.2.4 Construction of Rest-of-World (ROW) aggregates 
The series for ROW real GDP (GDPR) is constructed as follows. First, we normalise the series for 
GDP in national currency (NAC) at constant prices for each country (i) at the common base year 
t=0: 
1
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Then we calculate the time-varying share of each country in the block based on nominal GDP 
(GDPN) in USD. Finally, we compute ROW GDPR as the GDPN-weighted average of the 58 
countries, which gives the ROW GDPR index with base year t=0:   
,
58
,1
USD i
ROW it
t tUSD ROWi
t
GDPN
GDPR GDPR
GDPN

    
The aggregation applies time-varying weights in order to account for changes in the relative 
economic weight of individual ROW countries over the sample period. ROW GDPR is normalised 
to 1 in year 2005. 
 
The series for the ROW GDP deflator (PGDP) is constructed analogously to the ROW GDPR 
series. First, we normalise the series for the PGDP for each country (i) to base year t=0: 
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Then we calculate the time-varying share of each country in the block based on GDP in USD and 
compute the ROW PGDP as the GDP-weighted average of the 58 country series, which gives the 
ROW GDPR index with base year t=0: 
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ROW GDPR is normalised to 1 in year 2005. An index of ROW nominal GDP (GDPN) with base 
year 2005 can be calculated by multiplying ROW GDPR with ROW PGDP. 
 
The ROW block in the model has a flexible nominal exchange rate. The ROW nominal exchange 
rate to the USD (e) is calculated as GDP-weighted average of bilateral exchange rates against the 
USD for the 58 countries. As for GDPR and PGDP above, we normalise bilateral USD exchange 
rates in each country to the base year t=0: 
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The ROW nominal exchange rate to the USD with base year t=0 is then calculated as GDP-
weighted average of the 58 country series: 
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The ROW exchange rate to the USD is normalised to 1 in 2005. The exchange rate series includes 
exchange rate movements between members of the ROW group instead of attributing them to the 
ROW price index. 
 
The short-term interest rate for the ROW is the GDP-weighted average of interest rate series for 
countries (i) in the ROW. The sample is reduced to 47 countries due to limited data availability and 
the GDP weights are adjusted accordingly. 
 
The ROW trade balance (TB) balances international trade flows: 
( )ROW EA USt t tTB TB TB      
ROW exports equal the sum of EA and US imports from the ROW. The bilateral imports from the 
ROW are obtained by subtracting imports from the US (EA) from total EA (US) imports based on 
trade matrices for international good and service trade. Analogously, imports of the ROW equal 
EA plus US exports to the ROW. 
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A.3 Historical shock decompositions for DE, FR, IT and ES 
To quantify the role of different shocks as drivers of endogenous variables in the period 2000-2017 
we plot the estimated contribution of these shocks to historical time series. Figures A.3a-A.3d show 
historical shock decompositions of year-on-year growth rates of real GDP for the four estimated 
EA MS, namely DE, FR, IT, and ES. In each sub-plot, the continuous black line shows the historical 
time series, from which sample averages have been subtracted. The vertical black bars show the 
contribution of different groups of exogenous shocks (see below) to the historical data, while 
stacked light bars show the contribution of the remaining shocks. Bars above the horizontal axis 
represent positive shock contributions, while bars below the horizontal axis show negative 
contributions.  
 Given the large number of shocks, we plot the contributions of the following groups of 
exogenous variables: (1) ‘TFP’ represents the contribution of permanent shocks to productivity; 
(2) ‘Goods and Labour market’ captures supply side shocks (price and wage mark-up shocks, in 
DE also the shock to the unemployment benefit ratio to account for the Hartz reform); (3) 
‘Aggregate Demand’ includes demand-side shocks (household savings shock, fiscal shocks, 
investment risk premium shocks); (4) ‘Monetary EA’ represents the contribution of monetary 
policy shocks; (5) ‘Bond premium EA vs RoW’ represents shocks to the EA uncovered interest 
parity condition (exchange rate shocks); (6) ‘Trade shocks’ capture the worldwide relative 
preference for domestic-produced goods and foreign goods as well as price mark-up shocks for 
exports and imports; (7) ‘Shocks REA’ capture the remaining shocks originating in the rest of the 
Euro Area (demand and supply shocks); (8) ‘Shocks RoW’ represent the shocks originating in 
RoW (demand and supply shocks); (9) ‘Oil’ captures shocks to the Oil price. 
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Figure A.3a: Historical decomposition of real GDP growth in Germany. 
 
 
 
Figure A.3b: Historical decomposition of real GDP growth in France. 
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Figure A.3c: Historical decomposition of real GDP growth in Italy. 
 
 
 
Figure A.3d: Historical decomposition of real GDP growth in Spain. 
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A.4 Model fit of EA Member States 
In order to assess the fit of the model we can compare the estimates of endogenous variables with 
its observable counterparts. Figures A.4 show the Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction for key 
observable variables for DE, FR, IT and ES. The red line indicates the observed series from 
1999q1-2017q2 (quarter-on-quarter growth rates). The black line depicts the model-consistent 
estimate of the 1-step-ahead forecast of the endogenous variable calculated by the Kalman filter. 
The grey confidence bounds represent posterior parameter uncertainty. A specific credit on the 
plausibility of our estimated model to replicate key features of EA business cycles is to focus on 
capacity utilization. While capacity utilization is not directly measurable in national account 
statistics, we use a ‘model-free’ or reduced form proxy that has been constructed to compare the 
model-based and model-free estimate of capacity utilization. The lower right panel in Figures A.4 
plot the times series of capacity utilization implied by the constructed proxy (black dotted line) and 
the model-implied one computed via Kalman filter. Even without directly observing capacity 
utilization, the two measures coincide and give additional credit on the plausibility of the estimated 
model to replicate key features of EA business cycles. 
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Figure A.4a: Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction of Germany. 
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Figure A.4b: Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction of France. 
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Figure A.4c: Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction of Italy. 
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Figure A.4d: Bayesian 1-step-ahead prediction of Spain. 
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